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Graves: Graves: Does an Employee's Binding Arbitration Agreement

Does An Employee's Binding
Arbitration Agreement Limit The
Enforcement Powers Of The
EEOC?: The Supreme Court
Rules That it Does Not
EqualEmployment Opportunity Comm. v. Waffle House'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")2 was adopted in 1925, with the purpose
of reversing the trend of judicial hostility towards arbitration.3 Over the past 75
years, the FAA has had a dramatic effect on litigation, as well as on alternative
dispute resolution. However, since the FAA was reenacted and codified in 1947, the
FAA has not been amended.4 This lack of amendment has been the source of much
controversy, because Acts that have been codified since 1947 have not always been
consistent with the FAA.
One such Act is the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 5 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").6
Initially, the EEOC only had the power to investigate claims of workplace
discrimination and to attempt a reconciliation between the employer and the
employee, but the EEOC could not file suit.' In 1972 Congress adopted the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which drastically expanded the power of the
EEOC. One such change was to allow the EEOC to file a claim in its own name and
to seek reinstatement as well as back-pay on behalf of the employee.8 In 1991,
Congress again amended Title VII to allow the recovery of compensatory and
punitive damages by a "complaining party." 9 This included individuals as well as
the EEOC.' 0 Therefore, the EEOC can effectively file a claim and recover damages,
which will be paid to the injured employee, without the employee ever having filed
a claim in court.

1. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
2. 9 U.S.C. § § 1-16 (2000).
3. For an extended discussion see Joyce E. Taber, Student Author, An Unanswered Question About
Mandatory Arbitration:Should a Mandatory Arbitration Clause Precludethe EEOC From Seeking
Monetary Relief on an Employee's Behalf in a Title VII Case?, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 281 (2000).
4. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 288-289.
5. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (July 12, 1964).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2000).
7. See generally Gen. Telephone Co. of the N. W., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 325-326 (1980)
(explaining the limited enforcement provisions originally granted the EEOC prior to the 1972
amendments).
8. 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e-5(f) to (g) (2000).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(1) (2000).

10. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(d)(1)(A) (2000).
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The friction between the FAA and Title VII arises when an injured employee
has signed an arbitration agreement with an employer and subsequently experiences
discrimination in some fashion in the workplace. The FAA would require that the
employee take the action to arbitration, whereas if the EEOC found probable cause,
it could file in its own name and avoid the arbitration agreement. So, should the
EEOC be allowed to recover on the behalf of an employee who has signed an
arbitration agreement? A circuit split on this issue prompted the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari in EEOC v. Waffle House."
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On June 23, 1994, Eric Scott Baker ("Baker") applied for a job at a Waffle
House in South Carolina.' 2 As part of his employment application, Baker had to sign
an arbitration agreement, 3 in which he agreed that "any dispute or claim" arising4
from his employment with Waffle House would be "settled by binding arbitration."
On August 10, 1994, Baker began working for Waffle House as a grill operator.' 5
seizure while at work.' 6 On
Just over two weeks later, Baker suffered an epileptic
7
Baker.'
fired
House
Waffle
September 5, 1994,
Baker did not seek arbitration, but instead filed a timely charge of discrimination
with the EEOC, alleging that his discharge violated Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA").' The EEOC commenced an investigation of the
claim and found that there was probable cause.' 9 After failing to negotiate a
settlement between Waffle House and Baker, the EEOC filed a claim against Waffle
House in federal district court pursuant to Section 107(a) of the ADA and Section

11. To see the circuit split, compareEEOC v. Frank'sNursery & Crafts,Inc., 177 F.3d 448,458-462
(6th Cir. 1999) (holding that the EEOC can seek both monetary damages and equitable relief when it sue
on behalfof an employee who signed a mandatory arbitration agreement) with EEOCv. Kidder, Peabody
& Co., 156 F.3d 298, 300-301 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the EEOC can only seek injunctive relief
when it files an independent suit based on the charges of an employee who signed an arbitration
agreement) and EEOC v. Waffle House, 193 F.3d 805,812 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd 534 U.S. 279 (2002)
(agreeing with the Second Circuit).
12. Resp.'s Br. 1823, 2 (1999).
13. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 282. In particular the agreement states:
"The parties agree that any dispute or claim concerning Applicant's employment with Waffle House
will be settled by binding arbitration. The arbitration proceedings shall be conducted under the
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association in effect at the time a demand
for arbitration is made. A decision and award of the arbitrator made under the said rules shall be
exclusive, final and binding on both parties.... The costs and expenses of the arbitration shall be borne
evenly by the parties."
Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 283.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). The ADA provides the following: "No covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual
in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."
19. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 283.
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102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.20 Baker was not a party to the action.2 1 The
EEOC sought injunctive relief to "eradicate the effects of [respondent's] past and
present unlawful employment practices," as well as make whole relief for Baker,
including back pay, reinstatement, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.22
In response to the complaint, Waffle House filed a petition to compel arbitration
and to stay proceeding pursuant to the FAA. 2 The District Court denied the motion
after determining that Baker's employment contract did not include the arbitration
agreement.' Waffle House filed an interlocutory appeal, which was granted by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.25 The Fourth Circuit held than26
an enforceable arbitration agreement between Baker and Waffle House did exist.
The Fourth Circuit then decided, "what effect, if any, the binding arbitration
agreement between Baker and Waffle House has on the EEOC, which filed this
action in its own name both in the public interest and on behalf of Baker. , 27 The
Court determined that the EEOC was not bound by the arbitration agreement and had
independent statutory authority to bring suit in federal court.2 ' However, the Court
went on to find that the EEOC could not seek victim specific relief, but was instead
limited to injunctive relief.2 9
The EEOC sought certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, and the
Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Fourth Circuit.3" The Supreme Court
found that Title VII and the ADA "unambiguously authorize the EEOC to obtain
relief that it seeks in its complaint [injunctive as well as make-whole relief specific
to Baker] if it can prove its case against respondent."'" Furthermore, the Court held
that, "[t]here is no language in the statute [Title VII] or in either of these cases
[Occidental Life32 and General Telephone33] suggesting that the existence of an
arbitration agreement between private parties materially changes the EEOC's
statutory function or the remedies that are otherwise available.""

20. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000); 42 U.S.C, § 1981 (a)(2000).
21. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 283.
22. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § §2000e-5(f) to (g) (2000) (stating that EEOC can file a claim seeking back
pay, reinstatement, compensatory damages, and punitive damages on behelf of employee).
23. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 284.
24. Id. The district court based its decision on the fact the Baker had applied for a job at a Waffle
House in Columbia, South Carolina, but was ultimately hired at a different Waffle House in West
Columbia, South Carolina, without filling out a new employment application.
25. Id.
26. Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 808.
27. Id. at 809.
28. Id. at 811-12.
29. Id. at 812-13. The majority explained that, "[wihen the EEOC seeks 'make-whole' relief for a
charging party, the federal policy favoring enforcement of private arbitration agreements outweighs the
EEOC's right to proceed in federal court because in that circumstance, the EEOC's public interest is
minimal, as the EEOC seeks primarily to vindicate private, rather than public, interests. On the other
hand, when the EEOC is pursuing large-scale injunctive relief, the balance tips in favor of EEOC
enforcement efforts in federal court because the public interest dominates the EEOC's action." Id.at 812.
30. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 285.
31. Id. at 287.
32. OccidentalLife Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
33. Gen. Telephone, 446 U.S. 318.
34. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 288.
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In discussing the FAA, the Court noted that "nothing in the statute [the Federal
Arbitration Act] authorizes a court to compel arbitration of any issues, or by any
parties, that are not already covered in the agreement." 35 In its holding the Court
stated:
[P]ursuant to Title VII and the ADA, whenever the EEOC chooses... to
bring an enforcement action in a particular case, the agency may be
seeking to vindicate a public interest, not simply provide make whole
relief for the employee, even when it pursues entirely victim-specific
relief. To hold otherwise would undermine the detailed enforcement
scheme created by Congress simply to give greater effect to an agreement
between private parties that does not even contemplate the EEOC's
statutory function.36
The Court stated in plain language that: 1) the EEOC has independent statutory
authority to seek victim specific relief; and 2) nothing in the FAA speaks of holding
non parties to a private arbitration agreement, and therefore, the EEOC was free to
seek all remedies available to it under federal law."
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The EEOC
The EEOC was originally created by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
As originally enacted, Title VII authorized only a private right of action by
employees, and a public right of action by the Attorney General in cases involving
a pattern or practice of discrimination." The EEOC had the power to process claims
of discrimination and to attempt conciliation with employers, but could not file suit.,
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to allow the EEOC independent authority
to bring suit in court, in both individual, and pattern or practice cases.4 ' These 1972
amendments created a dual system of enforcement, in which the EEOC was to "bear
the primary burden of litigation, but the private action previously available under §
'
706 was not superseded. 42
Before any suit can be brought, a charge must be filed
43
with the EEOC. The EEOC will then investigate the claim, and determine if there
is probable cause. If probable cause is found, the EEOC must attempt to conciliate
the charge." If conciliation fails, the EEOC may bring an enforcement action in its

35. Id. at 289.
36. Id. at 296. Compare with the Fourth Circuit's holding in Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 805.
37. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 288, 294.
38. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701, 78 Stat. 253 (1964).
39. See Gen. Tel. Co., 446 U.S. at 325-326 (holding that EEOC may bring civil action again employer
under Title VII claim).
40. Id. at 325.
41. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(a) (2000); 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) (2000); 42 U.S.C. 2000e-6(c) (2000).
42. Gen. Tel., 446 U.S. at 326.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2000).
44. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2002/iss2/6

4

2002]

Graves: Graves: Does an Employee's Binding Arbitration Agreement
Does Binding ArbitrationAgreement Limit Powers of EEOC

443

own name, or may issue a right-to-sue letter to the individual so that individual can
then proceed in litigation.45 If the EEOC decides to file in its own name, an
employee may intervene, but may not initiate a suit in her own name.' Regardless
of who brings the suit, whether it be the EEOC or the employee, the relief available
is the same, which includes injunctive relief, back pay, and reinstatement.47
B. The FAA
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 to reverse a longstanding judicial hostility
toward arbitration that American courts inherited from the English common law.48
The purpose for its passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately made
agreements to arbitrate. 49 The FAA accordingly provides that written agreements to
arbitrate that are covered by the FAA "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon's such grounds as exist in law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the FAA manifests a "liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements." 5' Thus, when ruling on a petition to compel
arbitration under Section Four of the FAA, a court must ask two questions: First,
have the parties executed an arbitration agreement that covers the dispute in
question? Second, has one of the parties refused to abide by the agreement? 2 If
both of these questions are answered in the affirmative, then the court is compelled
to grant the petition for arbitration.53
C. Friction between the EEOC and the FAA
The United States Supreme Court strengthened the FAA in the case of Gilmer
v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corporation.54 In Gilmer, the EEOC sued on behalf of
an employee who alleged that his employer violated the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA") by terminating him because of his age.55 The
employee, Gilmer, had agreed to arbitrate any employment disputes that he had with
his employer. 6 The Supreme Court, relying in part on the FAA, held that the ADEA

45.
46.
47.
48.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2000).
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2000).
See Gilmer v. InterstatelJohnsonLane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (holding that claim was

subject to compulsory arbitration because of arbitration agreement).
49. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (holding that court should

compel arbitration on issues where an arbitration agreement has been signed).
50. Id. at 218.
51. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction

Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24 (1983)).
52. See PrimaPaint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,403-04 (1967) (holding that

parties must arbitrate issues pursuant to arbitration agreement unless evidence shows parties meant to
withhold issue from arbitration).
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20.
Id. at 23.
Id.
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claim could not be litigated and had to be pursued through arbitration.57 The
Supreme Court noted: "it is clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an
arbitration agreement, pursuant to the FAA,"58 and "questions of arbitrability must
be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration."59
An employment discrimination suit in a judicial setting is both time consuming
and expensive.' In an attempt to avoid the courtroom, many employers now require
prospective employees to agree to arbitrate any employment dispute that the
employee may have with his or her employer.6' The question then is whether the
EEOC can pursue compensatory and punitive damages in federal court on behalf of
an employee who has waived his right to a judicial forum by signing an arbitration
agreement with his or her employer.
D. The CircuitSplit
On October 6, 1999, the Fourth Circuit joined the Second Circuit in holding that
the EEOC is precluded from obtaining monetary relief on behalf of an employee
who has signed an arbitration agreement, though the EEOC would still be free to
pursue injunctive relief.62 After finding that there was an enforceable arbitration
agreement, the court then looked at the effect it had on the parties.63 The EEOC
argued that it never agreed to arbitrate its statutory claim, and that under its statutory
mandate, it had power to bring an action in federal court where venue is proper.6
The Fourth Circuit held in favor of the EEOC.65
The court's next step was to discuss the power of the EEOC, emphasizing its
statutory mandate and the purposes of enforcement of the antidiscriminatory
employment laws. 66 The Fourth Circuit found that the "statutory structure of Title
VII's enforcement remedies reflects the notion that the scope of the public interest
exceeds that of the individual's interest., 67 Moreover, the court acknowledged that
the Supreme Court implicitly recognized that under Gilmer, the EEOC is not bound
by private arbitration agreements when acting in its public role.68
Despite these findings, the Fourth Circuit went on to hold against the EEOC.
The court determined that when the EEOC is seeking victim specific relief, the FAA

57. Id. at 26-27.
58. Id. at 26.
59. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24).

60. An employment discrimination suit takes approximately two and a half years from the day the
complaint is filed to the day the trial begins; the average cost for an employer to defend an employment
discrimination suit is $130,000. Steven A. Brehm, Does EEOCv. Frank'sNursery & Crafts, Inc. Create
an End Run AroundArbitrationAgreements?: Whether an Employee's Binding ArbitrationAgreement
Precludesthe EEOCFromSeeking Back Payand Damageson Behalfof the Employee, 39 Brandeis L.J.

693,696 (2001).
61. Id.
62. Waffle House, 193 F.3d 805; Kidder, 156 F.3d 298.
63. Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 809.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 809-810.
67. Id. at 810.

68. Id. at 811 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32).
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will outweigh the potential public benefits, and therefore, the EEOC would be
precluded from seeking damages in court.69
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's case of EEOCv.
Kidder, Peabody & Company, the EEOC sued an employer for discriminating
against its employees by terminating employees over the age of 40.70 The Kidder,
Peabody court held that the EEOC was precluded from seeking monetary relief on
behalf of an employee when that employee had signed an arbitration agreement with
his employer. 7' To justify this, the Second Circuit asserted: "the FAA's liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements supports the conclusion that where the
individual has freely agreed to arbitrate a claim, that decision, like the decision to
waive or settle a claim, prevents the EEOC from pursuing monetary remedies on
behalf of the individual., 72 The court did recognize that the threat of an award of
monetary damages is important to the effective enforcement of employment
discrimination statutes. 73 However, the Second Circuit stated that their decision
"does not prevent the recovery of monetary damages; rather the employee is free to
seek such remedies through the arbitral process. ' 74 The court reasoned that the
possibility of a money judgment obtained by an individual through the arbitration
process would not have any less "deterrent value" than the award in court. The
court concluded that to allow an individual who has agreed to arbitrate his claims "to
make an end run around the arbitration agreement by having the EEOC pursue back
pay or liquidated
damages on his or her behalf would undermine the Gilmerdecision
76
and the FAA.
On April 23, 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
chartered a course different than that of the Second and Fourth Circuits. In the Sixth
Circuit case of EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc.,7 the court held that an
arbitration agreement between an employee and her employer did not preclude the
EEOC from seeking monetary relief on behalf of the employee for the employee's
Title VII claims.78 The Frank'sNursery court stated that allowing the EEOC to
pursue monetary relief on behalf of the employee would not undermine the FAA or
the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer.79 First, the Frank's Nursery court
determined that "Congress crafted Title VII so that the EEOC would possess an
independent right to sue in federal court to vindicate the public interest against
employment discrimination.""8 Therefore, the court reasoned that the interest in
protecting the EEOC's ability to control every Title VII action outweighs the interest
in enforcing arbitration agreements 8' Next, the court reasoned:

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 812.
Kidder, 156 F.3d 298.
Id. at 300-301.
Id. at 302 (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24).
Id.at 303.

74. Id.

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Frank'sNursery, 177 F.3d 448.

78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 459.
Id. at 461.
Id.
Id.
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Presumably, under Gilmer, if an individual subject to an arbitration
agreement filed a charge with the EEOC and ultimately received a right to
sue letter, that individual would have a private cause of action that she
agreed to waive by her prospective agreement to arbitrate. However, if an
individual subject to an arbitration agreement filed a charge with the EEOC
and put the EEOC on notice of employment practices violative of Tite VII,
and the EEOC in turn exercised its right to sue, that individual would no
longer possess a private cause of action subject to her prior agreement to
arbitrate. Rather, the EEOC would have a cause of action on behalf of that
individual and the public interest would fall outside the arbitration
agreement.8 2
The Frank's Nursery court also noted that their decision would not render
arbitration agreements useless. The court concluded that the "[EEOC's] resources
to pursue discrimination are limited, and the majority of employees who have signed
arbitration agreements will therefore not have the benefit of EEOC involvement." 3
IV. INSTANT DECISION
Within the first few lines of this rather short United States Supreme Court
opinion, one could effectively surmise what the outcome would be.8' The Supreme
Court stated that the starting point of their analysis would begin with "the provisions
of Title VII defining the EEOC's authority."85 The Court then went on to describe
those powers that had been given to the EEOC under federal statute. The Court
specifically noted the numerous amendments to Title VII, with each granting added
power to the EEOC.8 s
Next, the Court looked to the FAA, and noted that it has not been amended since
the enactment of Title VII in 1964.87 The Court emphasized that nothing in the FAA
"mention[s] enforcement by public agencies... [and the FAA] does not purport to
place any restriction on a nonparty's choice of a judicial forum." 8 From there, the
Court criticized the Fourth Circuit's balancing test of "competing policies" on the
grounds that the Fourth Circuit should have looked at the statutes and to the
agreement itself.8 9
Additionally, the Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's finding that to allow the
EEOC to pursue victim-specific relief "would significantly trample" the strong
federal policy favoring arbitration. 90 This is because the EEOC only actually files

82. Id. at 462.
83. Id. at 468 (quoting Kidder, 156 F.3d at 304).

84. I base this on the idea that had the Supreme Court opted to side with the FAA, then the Supreme
Court would have began its analysis with the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, but instead the
Court started with the powers of the EEOC.
85. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 285-86.

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 286-87.
Id. at 288-89.
Id. at 289.
Id. at 290

90. Id.
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claims in very few cases, leaving the vast majority of arbitration agreements
untouched.9'
The Supreme Court boils its criticism of the Fourth Circuit's ruling down into
one simple sentence: "[t]he compromise solution reached by the Court of Appeals
turns what is effectively a forum selection clause into a waiver of a nonparty's
The Court very simply found that the EEOC has the
statutory remedies."'
independent right to pursue victim-specific relief per Title VII, and nothing in the
FAA prohibits such a finding.93 Furthermore, the FAA only seeks to compel
arbitration of parties who agree to arbitrate, and since the EEOC was not a party to
the arbitration agreement, they cannot be prohibited from bringing a claim in federal
94

court.

A. The Dissent
Justice Thomas wrote the dissent which was supported by Justice Scalia and
Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Thomas began his analysis by pointing out that the
EEOC had the power to seek certain damages, but that it is the job of the courts to
determine what relief is appropriate. 95 Thomas then proceeded to state that victimspecific relief in this case is not appropriate for two reasons. 6 First, the EEOC must
take a victim as they find her.97 Second, finding for the EEOC in this case would
"contravene the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements embodied in
the FAA." 98
Under the first reason, Thomas pointed out that the "EEOC's ability to obtain
relief is often limited by the actions of an employee on whose behalf the
Commission may wish to bring a lawsuit." 99 Limiting factors include res judicata,
an employee's failure to mitigate, and an employee settling the claim.'0 The dissent
states:
In all of the aforementioned situations, the same general principle applies:

to the extent that the EEOC is seeking victim-specific relief in court for a
particular employee, it is able to obtain no more relief for that employee
than the employee could recover for himself by bringing his own lawsuit.'0 '
Under this reasoning, Thomas found that the EEOC should be precluded from
seeking relief on behalf of Scott Baker, because Scott Baker could not seek it

himself.'0 2

91. Id.
at290 n.7.
92. Id.
at295.
93. Id.at 295-96.
94. Id. at 293-94..
95. Id.
at 301-02.
96. Id.at 304.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 308.
99. Id. at 304.
100. Id. at 304-05.
101. Id. at 305.
102. Id. at 308.
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Under the second reason, Thomas asserted that the majority asked the wrong
question." He stated that the real question is not whether the EEOC should be
bound to the arbitration agreement, but rather, should a court give effect to the
14
arbitration agreement entered into between Scott Baker and Waffle House. 0
Thomas found that allowing the EEOC to seek relief on behalf of Baker "eviscerates
Baker's arbitration agreement with Waffle House and liberates Baker from the
consequences of his agreement.""5 Therefore, Thomas found that the EEOC should
not be allowed to recover on behalf of Scott Baker, because to allow recovery would
go against the policy of the FAA.' °
V. COMMENT
"Clash of the Titans" would be a fitting title for this case. Since 1964, the
enforcement powers of the EEOC and the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration have been headed on a crash course. Congress has amended Title VII
multiple times to allow the EEOC greater enforcement powers,10 7 while
employers are more frequently requiring potential employees to sign arbitration
agreements.'0 FAA advocates say that by allowing the EEOC to seek victimspecific relief, arbitration agreements will become ineffective and meaningless.
EEOC advocates assert that victim-specific relief is essential to fighting
workplace discrimination, and that employers would brush off the EEOC if only
faced with the threat of an injunction." °
The Supreme Court's holding was in line with the EEOC position. The Court
held: "[i]f injunctive relief were the only remedy available, an employee who signed
an arbitration agreement would have little incentive to file a charge with the
EEOC."' n Furthermore, the Court observed that the FAA would not be "trampled"
for two reasons."' First, the EEOC has a statutory duty to engage in a conciliation
process between the employer and the employee prior to filing a claim.12 Therefore,
alternative dispute methods are preserved and the employer may take advantage of
them, prior to the EEOC filing a claim in court. Second, the Court noted that

103. Id.
104. Id. at 308-09.
105. Id. at 309.
106. Id. at 308.
107. Title VII was amended in 1972 to allow the EEOC to file a claim, in its own name, in federal
court. Prior to the amendment, the EEOC had no such power and it was up to the Attorney General to
file in cases involving a pattern or practice of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(6) (1970). Title VII
was again amended in 1991 to allow a "complaining party" to seek damages for employment
discrimination. Congress specifically defined "complaining party" to include the EEOC. Br. for the
Petr. at 18-19, 28 (n.d.).
108. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 296 n. 11 (noting that there are an estimated 3.5 million employees
covered by arbitration provisions).
109. For a critical analysis of this, see Brehm, supra n. 60; John Taylor, Helping Those Who Help
Themselves: The Fourth Circuit's Treatment of Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment
DiscriminationClaimsin Brown v. ABF FreightSystems, Inc. and EEOC v. Waffle House,Inc., 79 N.C.
L. Rev. 239 (2000); Taber, supra n. 3.
110. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 296 n. 11.
111. Id. at 290 n. 7.
112. Id.
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arbitration agreements across the board would hardly be affected, because the EEOC
files in less than three
percent of cases, thus leaving the vast majority of arbitration
3
intact."
agreements
The Court's decision is sound for three reasons. First, it is consistent with the
FAA and the Court's prior rulings. Second, it has ensured that the EEOC can
continue to effectively deter work place discrimination. Third, the Court's ruling has
given some sense of bargaining power back to employees and has perhaps slowed
the movement toward favoritism of arbitration agreements.
A. Consistency with the FAA and PriorDecisions
The Court's ruling is consistent with the purpose of the FAA, as well as the
Court's prior decisions. The FAA is designed to enforce arbitration agreements as
between parties that have agreed to arbitrate. The FAA directs courts to place
arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts, but it "does not require
parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so.""' 4 The purpose of the FAA
is to make "arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more
so.''5 Furthermore, "the FAA does not confer a right to compel arbitration of any
dispute at any time; it confers only the right to obtain an order directing that
arbitration proceed in the mannerprovidedfor in [the partiesI agreement."" 6
With this purpose and with prior decisions in mind, the Court reasoned that the
first question to ask was whether the EEOC agreed to arbitrate."' After finding that
the answer to this question was no," 8 the Court reasoned that the FAA would not
force arbitration on a non-party.
B. The EEOC's ContinuedPower to Deter Discrimination
The Court's decision ensures that the EEOC will continue to have effective
powers to deter work-place discrimination. Prior to 1972, the EEOC could not file
a claim on its own behalf." 9 In 1972, Congress realized that "the failure to grant the
EEOC meaningful enforcement powers [had] proven to be a major flaw in the
operation of Title VII."'2 ° Therefore, Congress granted the EEOC the power to
litigate individual claims. In 1975, the Supreme Court noted that back pay does not
simply make the individual victim whole; it provides "the spur or catalyst which
causes employers . . . to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible," their
discriminatory practices.' 2

113. Id.
114. Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland StanfordJr. U,489 U.S. 468,478 (1989).
115. Prima Paint,388 U.S. at 404 n. 12.
116. Volt, 489 U.S. at 474-75 (emphasis added).
117. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294.
118. Id. The Court stated, "No one asserts that the EEOC is a party to the contract, or that it agreed
to arbitrate its claims. It goes without saying that a contract cannot bind a nonparty."
119. Frank'sNursery & Crafts, 177 F.3d at 457.
120. Id.
121. AlbernarlePaper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
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In 1991, Title VII was amended to allow a "complaining party" to seek
damages."2 The first version of the amendment did not include the EEOC in the
definition of "complaining party." However, it was amended to specifically include
the EEOC as a complaining party because Congress felt that the earlier version
would, "undermine the [EEOC's] ability to enforce Title VII."'
Had the Court not allowed the EEOC to seek individual relief, the EEOC would
return to the same ineffectual position it was in prior to 1972. The Court's decision
reinforces Congress's goal to provide the EEOC with a full range of powers to
effectively deter workplace discrimination.
C. Employee BargainingPower
The purpose of the FAA is to make "arbitration agreements as enforceable as
other contracts, but not more so.',' 24 The concept of a contract is that parties have
come to an agreement, through equal bargaining powers. It seems difficult to
believe that the average, non-business savvy employee has a lot of say when it
comes to what they are required to sign before they are hired. It seems more
reasonable to surmise that the average person does not have an understanding of an
arbitration agreement, but rather is focused on obtaining ajob. It is equally unlikely
that a potential employee could do much bargaining when it comes to an arbitration
agreement, because the local employer probably is ignorant as to what the corporate
attorney has included in a contract filled with legalese, and therefore would have no
way, and probably no authority, to negotiate.
Prior to this case, the federal policy governing arbitration was turning into a
federal policy of arbitration favoritism. Instead of looking at arbitration agreements
as any other contract that must be entered into willingly and with some sense of
bargaining power, it appeared courts were willing to enforce any agreement that was
signed. Here, the Supreme Court steps back and treats this arbitration agreement as
it should be treated--as any other contract. The EEOC did not agree to arbitrate, and
therefore, they could not be forced to do so.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's ruling is consistent with the purpose of the FAA as well as the
Court's prior decisions. It ensures that the EEOC will continue to have its full
statutory powers to effectively fight work-place discrimination. To have held
otherwise would have rendered the EEOC ineffective. While the Court did not agree
with the holding of the Fourth Circuit, it did not entirely reject the principles
advanced therein. The Court stated: "[E]ven if the policy goals underlying the FAA
did necessitate some limit on the EEOC's statutory authority, the line drawn by the
Court of Appeals between injunctive and victim-specific relief creates an
uncomfortable fit with its avowed purpose ofpreserving the EEOC's public function

122. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
123. Br. of Pet. at 18-19 (n.d) (citing 137 Cong. Rec. 28, 860-28, 861 (1991) (letter from EEOC
Chairman Evan J. Kemp, Jr. to Sen. Kennedy)).
124. Prima Paint,388 U.S. at 404 n. 12.
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while favoring arbitration."' 25 This sentence seems to imply that the Court would not
be opposed to any given limitation on the EEOC's power, and may well be the focus
of future cases that seek to limit the EEOC's power.
ADAM W. GRAVES

125. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294.
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